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The Effects of Firm Size on Job Quality:  
A Comparative Study for Britain and France 
Alex Bryson, Christine Erhel, Zinaïda Salibekyan 
Abstract 
Using linked employer-employee data from two comparable surveys we examine the links 
between non-pecuniary job quality and workplace characteristics in Britain and France – 
countries with very different employment regimes. We find job quality is better in Britain 
than it is in France, despite its minimalist regulatory regime. The difference is apparent for 
all dimensions of job quality (skill development, training participation, job autonomy, job 
insecurity, work-life balance and relations between employers and employees), except skills’ 
match to a job. Firm size is negatively associated with non-pecuniary job quality in both 
countries but in France the association is confined to only the largest firms. Internal Labour 
Markets (ILMs) are associated with higher job quality in France, but not in Britain. 
Keywords: job quality, firm size, internal labour market, linked employer-employee data, Britain, 
France, international comparison.  
JEL Codes: I31; J30; J81 
LA QUALITÉ DE L’EMPLOI EN FRANCE ET EN GRANDE-BRETAGNE : 
QUELS EFFETS DE LA TAILLE DE L’ENTREPRISE ? 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Sur la base de deux enquêtes couplées employeurs-employés comparables (REPONSE et 
WERS), ce document propose une analyse des liens entre les caractéristiques des 
établissements et la qualité de l’emploi en France et en Grande-Bretagne. Un premier 
résultat est que la qualité de l’emploi perçue par les salariés apparaît plus élevée en 
Grande-Bretagne qu’en France, malgré un régime d’emploi peu protecteur. Cette 
différence est observée pour toutes les dimensions de la qualité de l’emploi (développement 
des compétences, formation, autonomie, sécurité de l’emploi, équilibre vie privée-vie 
professionnelle, relations sociales), à l’exception de l’ajustement des compétences à l’emploi 
occupé. Deuxièmement, l’analyse montre que la taille de l’entreprise diminue la qualité de 
l’emploi dans les deux pays, mais cet effet négatif n’existe en France que pour les très 
grandes entreprises. Enfin, l’existence d’un marché interne du travail dans l’entreprise 
(i.e. des pratiques de stabilisation de la main-d’œuvre conduisant à des salaires et à une 
ancienneté moyenne plus élevés) est associée à une meilleure qualité de l’emploi en 
France, mais pas en Grande-Bretagne. 
Mots-clefs : qualité de l’emploi, taille de l’entreprise, marché interne du travail, données couplées, 
France, Grande-Bretagne, comparaison internationale.
 

SYNTHÈSE DES PRINCIPAUX RÉSULTATS 
Selon les développements récents de la littérature économique, la qualité de l’emploi 
influence le bien-être des travailleurs, mais aussi leur productivité et la performance 
des entreprises. Elle varie entre les pays, mais aussi au sein même d’un pays, entre les 
groupes de travailleurs (selon l’âge, le genre, les niveaux d’éducation…), ou entre les 
établissements.  
Ce document de travail s’intéresse plus particulièrement à deux facteurs qui sont susceptibles 
d’influencer la qualité de l’emploi à l’échelle de l’établissement : la taille de l’entreprise à 
laquelle l’établissement appartient et l’existence de « marchés internes du travail » 
caractérisés par une stabilité des collectifs de travail et des possibilités de formation et de 
progression en interne.  
Les hypothèses testées sont les suivantes. Premièrement, selon les approches institutionnalistes, 
le régime d’emploi du pays influence la qualité de l’emploi. Dans cette perspective, on 
pourrait s’attendre à ce que la qualité de l’emploi soit meilleure en France (régime d’emploi 
dualiste assurant une forte protection des travailleurs du segment primaire) qu’en Grande-
Bretagne dans le cadre d’un régime libéral de fonctionnement du marché du travail, même si des 
travaux empiriques antérieurs ne valident pas cette hypothèse. Deuxièmement, la taille de 
l’entreprise a des effets théoriquement ambigus sur la qualité de l’emploi, selon que l’on 
met en avant ses effets potentiellement favorables sur les salaires, la qualité des politiques de 
formation ou de gestion des ressources humaines, ou à l’inverse sur l’existence de systèmes 
de contrôle avec une forte centralisation. Les travaux empiriques sur la satisfaction au travail 
conduisent plutôt à soutenir cette seconde hypothèse d’un effet négatif de la taille de 
l’entreprise sur la satisfaction au travail et la qualité de l’emploi. Troisièmement, au-delà 
de la taille, les pratiques de gestion des ressources humaines peuvent également avoir une 
incidence sur la qualité de l’emploi, en particulier lorsqu’elles se traduisent par la mise en 
place de « marchés internes du travail » (au sens de la théorie de la segmentation), 
s’accompagnant de salaires plus élevés, de formation et d’une certaine stabilité de l’emploi. 
Les recherches existantes montrent que ces pratiques sont plus répandues dans les entreprises 
françaises. 
L’article s’appuie sur les enquêtes REPONSE et WERS de 2011 afin de mener à bien la 
comparaison franco-britannique et de tester les liens entre taille de l’entreprise, existence 
d’un marché interne et qualité de l’emploi perçue par les salariés. Ces enquêtes, menées 
auprès des établissements, donnent un certain nombre d’informations sur des dimensions 
comparables de la qualité de l’emploi (même si les questions posées diffèrent) : sécurité de 
l’emploi, intensité du travail, autonomie, participation à la formation, développement des 
compétences, relations employeur/employés, appariement des compétences, conciliation 
entre vie familiale et vie professionnelle. Un indice synthétique est construit à partir de ces 
huit dimensions pour résumer la qualité de l’emploi. 
En termes descriptifs, les résultats obtenus montrent une qualité de l’emploi globale 
supérieure en Grande-Bretagne, avec des écarts sur certaines dimensions, telles que le 
sentiment de travailler sous pression du temps, plus répandu en France qu’en Grande-Bretagne, 
ou le sentiment d’autonomie dans le travail, plus élevé en Grande-Bretagne. 
Des régressions permettent d’identifier l’effet de la taille de l’entreprise et de l’existence 
d’un marché interne (correspondant aux établissements ayant des niveaux de salaire et 
d’ancienneté supérieurs à la médiane pour un profil d’âge, de genre et de niveau d’éducation 
des salariés donné), mais également l’incidence de certaines caractéristiques individuelles ou 
d’établissement. 
 
 
Parmi les résultats montrant des différences entre les deux pays, on observe que le niveau 
d’éducation augmente la qualité de l’emploi perçue en France (conformément à 
l’hypothèse d’un marché du travail dual, en relation avec le niveau de diplôme), tandis qu’il 
la réduit en Grande-Bretagne (ce qui pourrait renvoyer à des problèmes d’appariement). Le 
travail à temps partiel (30 à 35 heures) est associé à une moindre qualité de l’emploi en 
France, tandis qu’en Grande-Bretagne c’est le cas des durées longues de travail (plus de 
41 heures).  
Les analyses confirment que la taille de l’entreprise (au-dessus de 5 000 employés) réduit 
la qualité de l’emploi dans les deux pays. De plus, dans le cas britannique, la qualité de 
l’emploi est également plus faible que dans les petites pour les entreprises de 500 salariés et 
plus. Cette différence pourrait renvoyer à l’existence de seuils de taille imposant aux 
entreprises françaises d’assurer une représentation des salariés au-dessus de 50 salariés, qui 
n’existent pas en Grande-Bretagne. 
L’existence d’un marché interne est associée positivement à la qualité de l’emploi dans 
les deux pays, mais l’effet n’est significatif que dans le cas français, avec, de plus, une 
interaction positive avec la taille (supérieure à 10 000 salariés) pour ce pays seulement. Ceci 
renvoie à l’importance plus grande des logiques de marché interne dans les entreprises 
françaises par rapport aux entreprises britanniques.  
Les effets sont également analysés suivant les différentes dimensions constitutives de la 
qualité de l’emploi : la plupart des résultats confirment les conclusions obtenues avec l’indice 
synthétique de qualité de l’emploi pour la taille de l’entreprise et l’existence d’un marché 
interne. Le sentiment de sécurité de l’emploi ou encore la participation à la formation font 
exception et augmentent avec la taille de l’entreprise en France. 
Ainsi, cette analyse comparative sur données d’établissement confirme que la qualité de 
l’emploi est influencée par les institutions et régimes d’emploi nationaux, mais 
également par les caractéristiques des entreprises et leurs pratiques en matière de 
gestion des ressources humaines. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Job quality affects worker wellbeing (Karasek, 1979; Bryson et al., 2016), worker 
productivity (Oswald et al., 2015) and thus firm performance (Bryson et al., 2015). It is 
multi-faceted but its main features are well-known. It varies markedly across countries, partly 
reflecting differences in national institutional regimes (Gallie, 2007; Holman, 2013; Green et 
al., 2013; Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2011). However, there is also substantial within-country 
variation in job quality across employees and across workplaces. The latter reflects both 
structural features of workplaces, such as industry affiliation, and the choices employers 
make regarding investments in job quality, which in turn reflect perceptions of the costs and 
benefits of such investments. Osterman (2013), for example, has emphasised the importance 
of accounting for employer decisions over working conditions when seeking to understand 
variance in job quality.  
The article contributes to the literature by focusing on two features of workplaces that are 
likely to influence job quality: the size of a firm and the existence of internal labour markets 
(ILMs), characterized by ongoing skill development, opportunities for career progression and 
higher returns to seniority. This is done in a comparative context to investigate how these 
workplace features relate to job quality across two very different institutional contexts. The 
article focuses on Britain and France because they represent very different types of 
employment regime and because they provide data that are uniquely suited to understanding 
the associations between structural features of workplaces, workplace policies and practices, 
and job quality as experienced by employees in those workplaces. Data issues limit our 
ability to compare identical job quality items across Britain and France, but the indicators are 
sufficiently comparable to provide some indications regarding levels of job quality in the two 
countries. 
Three hypotheses are tested in the current study. First, job quality should be better, on 
average, in more highly regulated economies such as France, compared to liberal market-
oriented economies like Britain. The second proposition is that job quality is negatively 
correlated with firm size in both countries. The third hypothesis argues that some specific 
features of the French regime will contribute to better job quality. These features are the 
presence in French workplaces of specific human resources policies favoring internal 
mobility through seniority premiums or well developed further training (usually 
characterized as “internal labour markets” –ILMs), which are often embedded in larger firms, 
and the existence of compulsory worker representation over a certain firm size. Contrary to 
expectations, the results show that job quality is better in Britain than it is in France. 
However, as anticipated, firm size is negatively associated with non-pecuniary job quality in 
both countries. In both countries job quality is significantly lower in the largest firms (those 
with 5,000 or more employees) than it is in the smallest firms with fewer than 50 employees). 
However, whereas in France there is no significant difference in job quality between small 
and medium sized (500-4,999 employee) firms, in Britain job quality is significantly lower in 
the medium-sized compared with the small firms. It is possible that in France the main legal 
threshold (at 50 employees) (Trésor-Eco, 2016), above which firms are required to respond 
positively to worker demands for  union delegates and work councils, helps mitigate the 
adverse impact of firm size, at least for medium-sized firms. The results also show that being 
in a firm with an ILM is associated with better non-pecuniary job quality in France but not in 
Britain. 
 
The Effects of Firm Size on Job Quality: A Comparative Study for Britain and France 
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the literature, focusing on the 
relationship between job quality, firm size and ILMs and outlines our hypotheses. Section 2 
describes the linked employer-employee data for the two countries and the empirical 
methodology. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes, reflecting on the 
implications of the analyses while, at the same time, drawing attention to some limitations. 
1. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
Job quality should be linked to the sort of employment regime workers face (Gallie, 2007; 
Davoine et al., 2008). For example, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature emphasizes 
the importance of production regimes (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Coordinated Market 
Economies (CME) like France are characterized by long-term corporate investment, “Social 
Dialogue” and cooperative employment relations, and substantial initial vocational training, 
all of which are conducive to higher levels of job quality. Britain, on the other hand, as a 
prototypical Liberal Market Economy (LME), is characterized by a financial system 
imposing short-term horizons on firms and high risk taking, which is allied to a deregulated 
labour market and fragmented, uncoordinated employment relations, and an emphasis on 
general over vocational education, all of which should be conducive to lower job quality.  
According to Gallie (2007), job quality also depends on the way employment regimes build 
power resources for labour and capital. He considers three ideal-types: inclusive, dualist and 
market regimes. France is a dualist employment regime, with a well-protected core of 
workers, surrounded by a precarious periphery. Britain exemplifies a market based 
employment regime, with very limited regulation and few opportunities for workers to build 
the power resources which might be used to generate high quality jobs.  
Whether one thinks in terms of production or employment regimes it seems likely that 
average job quality should be lower in Britain than in France. This is the first hypothesis that 
the article tests.  
The expectation is also that job quality should vary with firm size in both countries. Due to 
their product market dominance, and thus the rents that accrue to them, larger firms may 
offer their workers higher job quality than might be offered in similar, smaller firms. If so, 
this may be a form of rent-sharing akin to the well-known wage premium linked to firm size 
(Oi and Idson, 1999). Larger firms also require formal policies and procedures to manage 
larger groups of employees efficiently whereas, in smaller firms, less formal systems may 
suffice. As such Human Resources departments may devote time and energy to human 
resource management (HRM) systems which are often equated with job quality, such as the 
formation of teams, payment of incentive pay, and the conscious design of more attractive 
jobs offering autonomy and variety.  
However, there are also strong theoretical reasons to suspect that job quality deteriorates as 
firm size increases. Bigger firms are able to use their centralized HR resources to create 
systems of monitoring and supervision which may be inimical to job quality, and may choose 
to divide up responsibilities and tasks across workers which, in smaller firms, may be 
retained within the same job, thus offering task variety. Taylorist methods of scientific 
production were pioneered in large workplaces, such as car plants, and are notorious for 
deskilling workers in pursuit of profit and managerial control, thus limiting job autonomy 
(Edwards, 1979).  
Although the theoretical literature regarding firm size and job quality may be ambiguous, the 
empirical literature on employee perceptions of job quality is unequivocal: employees tend to 
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express greater satisfaction with their jobs in smaller firms (Forth et al., 2006; Clark and 
Oswald, 1996). Job satisfaction scholars argue that poor management-employee relationships 
in large firms are one source of such job dissatisfaction (Tansel and Gazioglu, 2013). Forth et 
al (2006) find that employee job quality in Britain is higher in small firms than in large firms: 
small firms make less use of shifts, zero hours and annual hours contracts and small firm 
employees are more likely to say they have high degrees of control and influence in their 
work when compared with employees in larger firms. The second hypothesis, therefore, is 
that, in spite of theoretical ambiguities regarding firm size and job quality, firm size will be 
negatively associated with job quality in both Britain and France.  
On balance, one may suspect that job quality will be lower in larger firms for the reasons 
given above. However, the current study argues that features of the French employment 
regime may offset some of the firm size effects on job quality. This is for two reasons. First, 
the segmentation literature highlights the existence of ILMs within larger firms that should 
contribute positively to job quality as they imply better career prospects and more developed 
training to develop and retain core workers (Doeriger and Piore, 1971). Segmentation theory 
suggests the co-existence within countries of a primary sector containing better paying, more 
stable jobs and a secondary sector, consisting of employees with poor pay, low job security 
and otherwise unattractive jobs (Piore, 1978). Workplaces with an ILM-type orientation 
(belonging to the primary sector) may offer better job quality to their employees than 
workplaces that do not have an ILM orientation. If ILMs are themselves positively correlated 
with firm size, they may limit any adverse impact firm size has on job quality. It is therefore 
important to account for ILM practices when investigating links between firm size and job 
quality.  
Recent empirical research indicates that ILMs are more embedded in French workplaces than 
they are in British workplaces (Forth et al., 2016) and may therefore play a bigger role in 
determining job quality in workplaces in France. The literature characterizes France as a 
country with strong ILMs as core workers benefit from employment protection, and have 
better opportunities for career progression within firms, and high returns to seniority 
(Maurice et al., 1986; Eyraud et al., 1990). On the other hand, peripheral workers in the 
secondary sector tend to be excluded from firms’ investments in training (Marsden, 1990). In 
contrast to France, Britain used to be considered a country of occupational labour markets 
(OLM), in which employers and unions used to organize external mobility inside occupations 
(Eyraud et al., 1990), but it has evolved through time and today considerable responsibility is 
placed on individual employees.  
The second reason why firm size effects may be mitigated in the French case is that firm size 
thresholds also feature in French law, offering employees some rights to worker 
representation (Fulton, 2015) and therefore some semblance of protection and job security, 
which might be lacking in smaller firms (Holman, 2013). Such regulations are likely to 
reinforce unions’ ability to mobilize core employees of large firms (Culpepper, 1999; 
Hyman, 2001).1 In France, by contrast, firms with more than 50 employees have to enable 
workers to appoint union delegates. It is also necessary for them to accede to employee 
requests for staff delegates where they have more than 10 employees, as well as a work 
council where they have more than 50 employees. These regulations suggest that employee 
1 To keep their institutional power resources, unions, de facto, defend the two-tier labour market reforms as their 
preferences are dependent on the institutional context (Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013). When involved in 
negotiations relating to job security legislation, for instance, unions’ main aim has traditionally been to maintain the 
protection given to workers on permanent contracts, sometimes to the disadvantage of those on temporary employment 
contracts.  
9 
                                              
The Effects of Firm Size on Job Quality: A Comparative Study for Britain and France 
bargaining power is stronger in medium-sized and larger firms in France than in small firms. 
This is in line with the expectations of the employment regime framework that within dualist 
regimes the historical involvement of organized labour is much greater in larger firms, which 
increases its chances of influencing working conditions and employment regulation (Holman, 
2013), and therefore job quality. 
Contrary to France, in market employment regimes like the UK organized labour has little 
involvement in decision-making within firms and its influence is uniform across the economy 
(Holman, 2013). UK unions’ objectives generally do not include job protection issues 
(Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013). Besides, the standard labour contract is characterized 
by a high level of flexibility. As a result, employers have greater flexibility to hire and fire 
workers in Britain than in many other European countries, and unions have less power to 
affect employment conditions (Green, 2013). It seems unlikely, therefore, that union 
bargaining power would result in firm size differences in job quality in Britain.  
Firm size also matters for training policies in France where firm-funded training aims to 
provide better opportunities for career development (Paul, 1992). France differs from Britain 
in placing legal obligations on all firms, but at a higher level for larger firms (more than 
10 employees) than for smaller ones. Firms with over 10 employees have to spend at least 
1% of their wage bill on training (it was 1.6% before 2014), and small firms 0.55%. The 
comparative data used in the current study do not contain workplaces with 10 employees or 
less, so it is not possible to test what effect, if any, this employment threshold has on 
training-related job quality. Nevertheless, the legal obligation to provide training in France 
suggests training incidence will be greater in France than Britain, where no such training 
requirement exists. Vocational training is also a topic for social bargaining at various levels 
in France (firm, branch, regions and national level).   
British governments support training policies, but very few collective agreements exist on 
continuing training, and firms have to invest voluntarily in their workers with little regulation 
or subsidy (Greenhalgh, 1999; Ok and Tergeist, 2003). Although employees in larger 
organisations with 250 or more employees have a right to time off for training after 
26 weeks’ employment it is a right to unpaid time off.2 
2. DATA AND METHODS 
The data come from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 2011) and 
from the French Enquête Relations Professionnelles et Négociations d’Entreprise 
(REPONSE 2011).3 The WERS and REPONSE linked employer-employee surveys are among 
the most authoritative sources of information on employment relations. Other surveys may 
offer broader coverage of the two economies or a larger set of harmonized data items, but the 
WERS and REPONSE surveys offer the unique advantage that the samples of workplaces and 
employees are fully linkable in each country. In order to have harmonized datasets 
workplaces with eleven or more employees were selected with at least 15 months of tenure 
and include private industries except agriculture. The surveys are based on stratified random 
samples so that when survey weights are applied analyses are representative for this 
population in both countries. The analysis uses equivalently defined samples of 
2 https://www.gov.uk/training-study-work-your-rights 
3 For details of both surveys see Amossé et al. (2016) and http://www.niesr.ac.uk/projects/employment-relations-britain-
and-france. 
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3,947 workplaces and 11,244 employees from REPONSE in 2011 and 1,602 workplaces and 
11,581 employees from WERS 2011.  
Using the REPONSE and WERS surveys, eight dimensions of non-pecuniary job quality can 
be investigated, although caution should be exercised with regard to comparisons because the 
wording of the questions is different in the two surveys. Differences in wording partly reflect 
differences in the institutional context where employees are employed (Coutrot, 1998). Thus, 
this study takes great care when comparing job quality levels in the two countries.  
Responses to questions relating to job quality were coded as 0/1 variables where a code “1” 
indicates the job has a particular attribute while a “0” indicates it is absent. In a number of 
cases ordinal responses are elicited from the respondent, and the variables have been 
collapsed into 0 – 1 dummy variables. Accordingly, eight different aspects of job quality are 
captured in both surveys as per Table 1 (full details of the survey questions and weighted 
distributions are presented in Appendix Tables A1-A4. Bivariate correlations between job 
quality items are presented in Appendix Tables A5-A6). A single job quality index was also 
constructed by summing the dummy variables, having reverse-coded those dummies 
capturing poor job quality. The final index runs from zero to eight. Factor analysis was 
performed to check if there was a single index that could be called job quality. In both 
countries factor analyses identified a single factor with an eigen value above 1 (2.23 in 
France and 1.92 in Britain). In France this factor accounts for 96% of the variance in the 
eight items and in Britain it accounts for 89% of the variance.  
Table 1 Employee Job Quality in France in 2011 
 WERS REPONSE 
Job insecurity 16 (0.37) 16 (0.37) 
Work intensity 41 (0.49) 72 (0.45) 
Job autonomy 85 (0.35) 67 (0.47) 
Training participation 52 (0.50) 46 (0.50) 
Skill development 56 (0.50) 43 (0.50) 
Employee-employer relations 55 (0.50) 51 (0.50) 
Skills matched to job 44 (0.50) 63 (0.48) 
Adverse effects of work on one’s private life 29 (0.45) 36 (0.48) 
Job quality additive index4 (0,8) 5,02 (1.76) 4,25 (1.96) 
N 11,581 11,244 
Country Britain France 
Notes: Table is weighted using employee survey weights. Job quality is based on 8-point item scale. 
The scales for job quality range from 0(low) to +8(high). Standard deviation in parentheses. 
Base: All employees with at least one year’s tenure, in private workplaces with 11 or more employees, 
and no missing data on job quality. 
 
Table 1 shows the percentage of employees in each survey scoring ‘1’ on each of the job 
quality items. Relatively few employees in either country perceived their jobs as insecure, 
even though the surveys took place not long after the Great Recession. Perceptions of 
understanding between management and employees were also similar across the two 
4 The mean value of job quality index sums the scores for all eight items having reverse-coded those dummy variables 
identifying poor job quality. 
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countries, with roughly half giving management positive scores. However, in a number of 
other respects perceptions of job quality across countries were quite different. Nearly three-
quarters of private sector employees in France (72%) said they were working under time 
pressure, compared to only two-fifths (41%) of British employees. British employees were 
more likely to say they were free to decide how to work (85% against 67% in France). 
Taking all eight items together, the job quality index is higher in Britain than it is in France, 
running counter to our proposition in our first hypothesis. Of course, this is simply a 
comparison in mean scores which does not take account of compositional differences in the 
workforce or the nature of workplaces. Figure 1 shows the distribution of job quality on the 
index score in the REPONSE and WERS surveys. The density plot appears to be more 
skewed to the right in the WERS rather than in the REPONSE survey.  
 
 
Notes: Figure is weighted. Job quality is based on 8-point item scale. The scales for job quality 
range from 0(low) to +8(high). 
Base: All employees with at least one year’s tenure, in private workplaces with 11 or more 
employees, and no missing data on job quality 
 
Appendix Table A7 presents the distribution of employees across the firm size distribution in 
each country.5 Employees in France are more concentrated in small firms: 24% are employed 
in workplaces belonging to firms with between 11 and 49 employees compared with 15% in 
Britain. British employees are more concentrated in the largest firms: 31% are in workplaces 
which belong to firms with more than 5,000 employees, compared to 16% in France.  
The ILM indicator used in the current study is the one used by Forth et al. (2016) using the 
same data as the present article does. Workplaces with a strong ILM orientation are those 
which, for a given gender, age, and education profile within the workforce, sit at or above the 
median in both the distribution of workplace fixed effects for employee job tenure and the 
distribution of workplace fixed effects on wages. Appendix Table A8 shows that 13% of 
employees in Britain are in workplaces with an ‘ILM’ orientation whereas in France this is 
the case for 33% of employees, confirming that ILMs are more prevalent in France.  
Multivariate models were estimated on the additive job quality indicator having transformed 
it into a standardized z-score with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1, which makes it 
5 The data contain both firm size and workplace size, which are not used interchangeably. They are identical for single-
workplace firms. 
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easier to interpret the quantitative association between job quality and various individual and 
workplace characteristics.  
Ordinary Least Squares models were estimated to capture the variance in job quality across 
employees in workplaces with different characteristics, based on the following equation. 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =𝛼𝛼  +𝛽𝛽 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + λ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + µ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 (1) 
 
Where Yij   is the dependent variable job quality of employee i in workplace j,  
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  corresponds to the vector of seven demographic and job characteristics namely gender, 
age (three categories), education (seven categories), union membership, tenure (four 
categories), type of contract (three categories) and working hours (five categories).  
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖  corresponds to the vector of four workplace and firm characteristics, namely single-digit 
industry (twelve categories), family ownership (25% threshold, three categories), foreign 
ownership (two categories), location of the workplace (two categories).  
ILM is a dummy variable indicating the existence of ILM in the firm j, and F represents firm 
size (four categories). 
Dij  is a dummy variable denoting whether individual i in workplace j is in the REPONSE or 
WERS survey, and 𝜎𝜎 is the coefficient for that country dummy.  
The empirical analysis includes three steps. First equation 1 includes a country dummy to 
identify the role of the country on non-pecuniary job quality, thus testing hypothesis 1. In a 
second step estimations are run separately for each country to test the relationships between 
individual and firm characteristics (focusing on firm size and ILM) and job quality, and 
therefore testing hypotheses 2 and 3. Finally in a third step the same equation is run with 
eight different dependent variables (Qij which are (0,1) dummy dependent variables) 
corresponding to job quality sub-dimensions. 
3. RESULTS 
Table 2 reports pooled regressions both with and without control variables. Although in 
terms of production or employment regimes the expectation was that job quality was lower in 
Britain than in France, the findings show the opposite: average job quality is higher in Britain 
than in France. Thus the first hypothesis is rejected. These findings are in line with the 
descriptive statistics presented above. Despite the first hypothesis there is, in fact, other 
empirical support for this finding Europe (Davoine et al., 2008; Green et al., 2013). It is 
notable that the differential rises when controls are introduced, from -0.27 to -0.39, 
suggesting demographic and workplace traits are more conducive to higher job quality in 
France than they are in Britain. The -0.39 coefficient indicates that French employees 
experience job quality that is about two-fifths of a standard deviation lower than 
observationally similar employees in Britain6. 
 
6 The raw estimate of the country dummy variable in a reduced sample size has also been run, and the coefficient is -
0.28. This confirms that the shift in the coefficient is due to the additional control variables rather than the change in 
sample size that occurs when we introduce them. 
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Table 2. Job Quality (in standardized z-score) in France and in Britain  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.11*** (0.03) 0.18*** (0.06) 
REPONSE (Ref.: WERS) -0.27*** (0.03) -0.39*** (0.03) 
Male (Ref.: Female)   -0.01 (0.03) 
Age: 16-29 (Ref. 30-49)   0.05* (0.03) 
50+    0.06 (0.05) 
Education: Level 2 (Ref.: Level 0/1)    0.01 (0.05) 
Level 3    0.02 (0.04) 
Level 5B    0.16*** (0.04) 
Level 5A short/med    0.02 (0.04) 
Level 5A Long/6    0.24*** (0.05) 
Union member: yes (Ref.: no)    -0.25*** (0.04) 
Tenure: less than 5 (Ref.: 10+)    -0.03 (0.03) 
5 to 10 years    -0.01 (0.03) 
Hours: 0-29 (Ref.: 36-40)    0.002 (0.03) 
30-35    -0.09*** (0.03) 
41-49    -0.10*** (0.03) 
50+    -0.17*** (0.04) 
Contract: temporary (Ref.: permanent)    -0.11 (0.13) 
Fixed     -0.04 (0.06) 
Firm size: 50-499 (Ref.: less than 50)    -0.05 (0.03) 
500-4,999    -0.08** (0.04) 
5,000 and more     -0.12*** (0.04) 
ILM workplace: yes (Ref.: no)    0.19*** (0.03) 
Industry: Energy (Ref. : Manufacturing)    0.44*** (0.11) 
Construction    0.22*** (0.05) 
Wholesale and retail    0.07 (0.04) 
Hotel and restaurants    0.04 (0.07) 
Transport and communication    -0.002 (0.06) 
Financial services     0.17** (0.07) 
Other business     0.14*** (0.04) 
Education    0.07 (0.08) 
Health    0.30*** (0.05) 
Other community services     0.12* (0.07) 
Family ownership: 25% of equity capital    -0.10*** (0.03) 
Foreign ownership    -0.05 (0.04) 
Capital city: yes (Ref. no)    0.04 (0.04) 
R-squared 0.02  0.07  
Observations 18,793  15,563  
Number of workplaces  4,427  3,897  
Notes: Weighted pooled OLS regressions. Dummies for missing observations are not presented. Standard 
errors in parentheses. The job quality index is presented in Section 3. Model 1 presents raw differences and 
Model 2 contains control variables. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1. 
Base: All employees in the REPONSE (2011) and WERS (2011) surveys with at least one year’s tenure, in 
private workplaces with 11 or more employees, with no missing data on job quality  
14 
Documents de travail du Centre d’études de l’emploi et du travail, n° 191, avril 2017 
Table 3. Subcomponents of job quality in the pooled data  
 
Job demands Insecurity Skill development 
Skills match 
to a job 
Training 
participation 
Job 
autonomy 
Adverse 
effects of 
work on 
one’s private 
life 
Employee-
employer 
relations 
Constant 0.33*** 
(0.03) 
0.15*** 
(0.03) 
0.49*** 
(0.03) 
0.57*** 
(0.03) 
0.28*** 
(0.03) 
0.86*** 
(0.02) 
0.14*** 
(0.02) 
0.55*** 
(0.03) 
REPONSE 
(Ref.: WERS) 
0.35*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.18*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.21*** 
(0.01) 
0.13*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.014) 
R2 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.03 
N obs 18,512 16,249 18,538 18,597 18,483 18,578 18,625 18,514 
N wkplaces 4,169 3,942 4,167 4,167 4,154 4,166 4,168 4,163 
Notes: Weighted pooled OLS regressions. Models control for individual and workplace job characteristics as discussed in the text. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance is denoted by *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1. 
Base: All employees in the REPONSE (2011) and WERS (2011) surveys with at least one year’s tenure in private workplaces with 11 or more employees, with no missing 
data on job quality. 
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The differences between France and Britain on subcomponents of job quality have also been 
examined, although the direct comparison between job quality items has to be interpreted 
carefully given differences in the questionnaire items.  
Table 3 shows that skill development, training participation, job autonomy, work-life 
balance and relations between employers and employees are perceived as poorer by 
employees in France than they are in Britain. Job demands are also higher in France than in 
Britain. The match between the skills possessed by the worker and those required in the job 
is the only dimension which offers better job quality to French employees. There are no 
significant differences between France and Britain in relation to job insecurity. 
Table 4 provides estimations testing hypotheses 2 and 3. Before turning to the main results 
on firm size and ILMs, other results will be briefly discussed that are consistent with our 
portrayals of France and Britain as different types of employment regime. For example, in 
France, non-pecuniary job quality is positively correlated with higher levels of education. 
The finding is consistent with the idea that France has a dualist employment regime in which 
the more highly educated are able to enter better jobs. In Britain, on the other hand, more 
highly educated employees report lower job quality, perhaps due to skills mismatch where 
the expectations of better educated workers do not match the available jobs in the labour 
market.  
In France workplace tenure of less than five years is associated with lower non-pecuniary job 
quality than being in a workplace ten years or more. This is in line with the expectation that 
in dualist regimes employees with higher tenure have higher job quality than employees with 
lower levels of tenure. This does not appear to be the case in Britain, in line with 
expectations regarding a market-oriented employment regime where the “insider” status 
conferred by high tenure is less relevant. 
Atypical working hours are associated with lower job quality: in France it is part-time 
workers (30 to 35 hours a week) who suffer lower job quality, while in Britain it is those 
working long hours (over 41 hours). No association is found to be with temporary or fixed 
contracts in France, but this may be explained by the fact that short term contracts are not 
taken into account as the REPONSE survey does not include workers who have been 
employed for less than 15 months. In Britain those on temporary contracts experience lower 
job quality.  
Turning to the association between non-pecuniary job quality and workplace features, the 
focus is on firm size and the presence of ILM. Concerning firm size, the findings show 
that working in a large firm (5,000 employees and over) decreases job quality, consistent 
with hypothesis two. However, the negative association between firm size and job quality 
is confined to these very large firms in France. In Britain, on the other hand, the negative 
association is significant and apparent for firms as small as 500 employees. The absence 
of a firm size effect for medium-sized firms in France may be associated with the worker 
representation rights accorded workers in firms with at least 50 employees. 
ILMs are positively associated with job quality in both countries, but the association is only 
statistically significant in the case of France. This confirms our third hypothesis that ILMs 
play an important role in the French labour market and favour job quality. Furthermore, an 
interaction between ILM and firm size has also been introduced in the model. 
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Table 4. Job Quality (in standardized z-score) and Firm size in France and Britain  
 France (REPONSE) Britain (WERS) 
Constant -0.39*** (0.08) 0.43*** (0.09) 
Gender: male (Ref. female) 0.05 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) 
Age 16-29 (Ref: 31-49) 0.04 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 
50+ 0.03 (0.12) 0.01 (0.05) 
Education: Level 2 (Ref: Level 0/1) 0.12 (0.09) -0.20*** (0.06) 
Level 3 0.18*** (0.05) -0.19*** (0.05) 
Level5B 0.39*** (0.06) -0.14** (0.07) 
Level 5A short 0.31*** (0.07) -0.23*** (0.05) 
Level 5A long 0.50*** (0.07) -0.10 0.06 
Tenure: Less than 5 years (Ref: more than 10 years) -0.09* (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 
5 to 10 years  0.004 (0.04) -0.01 (0.05) 
Hours: 0-29 hours per week (Ref: 36-40 hours per week) -0.08 (0.06) 0.03 (0.04) 
30-35 -0.09** (0.04) -0.02 (0.05) 
41-49 -0.01 (0.04) -0.15*** (0.04) 
50+ -0.08 (0.05) -0.23*** (0.06) 
Contract: Temporary (Ref: permanent) 0.16 (0.23) -0.24* (0.14) 
Fixed  -0.001 (0.08) 0.03 (0.08) 
Union member: yes -0.25*** (0.05) -0.21*** (0.05) 
Firm size: 50-499 (Ref.: less than 50) -0.06 (0.04) -0.04 (0.05) 
500-4999 -0.01 (0.05) -0.15** (0.06) 
5000 and more  -0.09* (0.06) -0.15*** (0.06) 
ILM workplace: yes (Ref. no) 0.22*** (0.04) 0.07 (0.06) 
Industry: Energy (Ref: manufacturing) 0.47*** (0.17) 0.39*** (0.11) 
Construction 0.25*** (0.07) 0.22*** (0.09) 
Wholesale and retail 0.07 (0.05) 0.03 (0.08) 
Hotels and restaurants -0.01 (0.14) 0.04 (0.09) 
Transport and communication 0.02 (0.06) -0.06 (0.10) 
Financial services 0.12 (0.09) 0.18 (0.11) 
Other business 0.12** (0.05) 0.16** (0.07) 
Education  -0.08 (0.24) 0.15* (0.09) 
Health  0.28*** (0.06) 0.32*** (0.08) 
Other community services  0.21** (0.09) 0.07 (0.09) 
Family ownership:  25% of equity capital -0.16*** (0.04) -0.05 (0.05) 
Foreign ownership: yes (Ref. no) -0.13** (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 
Capital city: yes (Ref.: no) -0.02 (0.04) 0.07 (0.06) 
R-squared  0.07 0.05 
Observations  7,023 8,540 
Number of workplaces  2,935 962 
Notes: Weighted OLS regressions. Dummies for missing observations are not presented. Standard errors in parentheses. 
The index of job quality is presented in the section 3. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1.  
Base: All employees in the REPONSE (2011) and WERS (2011)surveys with at least one year’s tenure, in private 
workplaces with 11 or more employees, with no missing data on job quality  
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This interaction appears non significant in both countries. However, in a different 
specification based on other firm size classes7, the interaction between ILM and the largest 
firm size (10,000 plus employees) is positive and statistically significant in France, whereas 
it is negative and non-significant for Britain, thus confirming our contention in hypothesis 
three that ILMs would mitigate the negative association between firm size and job quality, 
but only in the French case. These results show the relevance of considering ILM practices as 
important drivers of job quality in the French employment regime, and the need to integrate 
this feature in workplace oriented analyses of job quality.8 9 
The estimates were also run for each of the eight dimensions of job quality: job demand, job 
insecurity, job autonomy, manager-employee relation, skills development opportunities, 
training received, skills match and work-life balance. The same controls were used as those 
in Table 4. The findings relating to firm size and ILMs are presented in Table 5 (for France) 
and in Table 6 (for Britain).  The overall impression from the results is that the associations 
with firm size and ILMs are quite heterogeneous across dimensions of job quality. 
The discussion of results begins by focusing on those two aspects of job quality emphasized in 
the work of Karasek (1979), namely job demands and job control. Job demands are not 
significantly associated with firm size in France. However, firm size is positively correlated 
with job demands in Britain. Job control is lower in larger firms in both countries, consistent 
with hypothesis two. Employees in large firms with more than 5,000 employees perceive lower 
job autonomy than employees in small firms in both surveys. This is in line with the 
expectation that bigger firms are able to use their centralized HR resources to create systems of 
monitoring and supervision which may be inimical to job quality. Once employees are in ILM 
workplaces in France, job autonomy appears to be higher, which is not the case in Britain.  
There is further support for the proposition in hypothesis two that firm size is negatively 
correlated with job quality. In France, this is the case in relation to poorer opportunities for 
skill development, greater skills mismatch and adverse effects of work on one’s private life. 
In Britain it is also the case in relation to adverse effects on one’s private life, but also poorer 
employer understanding of employees’ needs. The only positive associations between 
employment by a very large firm and job quality are in relation to lower job insecurity and 
higher training participation, both of which are confined to France. One possible explanation 
for this finding is that organized labour has more capacity to influence employment 
regulation and working conditions in large firms within dualist regimes than in small firms 
(Holman, 2013; Thelen and Kume, 1999). 
In addition to the evidence on job control noted above, there is further evidence that ILMs 
improve job quality in France: this is apparent in relation to the match between worker and 
job skills, and on reductions in the adverse effects of work, on one’s private life, to skill 
development perspectives, and to better employer understanding of employees’ needs. In 
contrast ILMs do not improve job quality in Britain except on one dimension – they reduce 
the adverse effects of work on one’s private life. 
7 11-99, 100-999,1000-4999,5000-9999,10000+. 
8 Forth et al. (2016) show ILMs are also relevant to the study of workplace HR practices. 
9 In the estimations run for the present article, industry and some ownership information have also been introduced in the 
workplace variables. Similar industry effects appear in France and Britain: compared to manufacturing, energy, 
construction, health, and business services have significantly higher job quality. Employment in a family-owned business 
is associated with lower non-pecuniary job quality in France but not in Britain. Forth and Rebérioux (2016) also show the 
existence of a wage penalty in family-owned firms. Furthermore, the results show that employment in foreign-owned 
business is associated with lower non-pecuniary job quality in France, but not in Britain. 
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Table 5. Subcomponents of job quality in France 
 
Job demand Insecurity Skill development 
Skills’ match 
to a job 
Training 
participation 
Job 
autonomy 
Adverse 
effects of 
work on 
one’s private 
life 
Employee-
employer 
relation 
Firm size: 50-499  
(Ref.: less than 50) 
0.023 
(0.014) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
500-4,999 0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
0.004 
(0.02) 
5,000 and more  0.016 
(0.019) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.14*** 
(0.03) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
ILM (Ref.: no) yes -0.14 
(0.013) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
Constant 0.70*** 
(0.03) 
0.19*** 
(0.03) 
0.26*** 
(0.03) 
0.69*** 
(0.03) 
0.25*** 
(0.03) 
0.61*** 
(0.03) 
0.30*** 
(0.03) 
0.44*** 
(0.03) 
R2 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.03 
Number of employees 9,465 7,341 9,459 9,443 9,346 9,463 9,464 9,433 
Number of workplaces 3,205 2,977 3,202 3,202 3,189 3,201 3,203 3,198 
Notes: Weighted OLS regressions. Dummies for missing observations are not presented. All models control for individual and workplace job characteristics. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1. 
Base: All employees in the REPONSE (2011) survey with at least one year’s tenure in private workplaces with 11 or more employees, with no missing data on job quality. 
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Table 6. Subcomponents of job quality in Britain 
 
Job demand Insecurity Skill development 
Skills’ match 
to a job 
Training 
participation 
Job 
autonomy 
Adverse 
effects of 
work on 
one’s private 
life 
Employee-
employer 
relation 
Firm size: 50-499 
(Ref.: less than 50) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.03) 
500-4,999 0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
5,000 and more  0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
ILM (Ref.: no) yes 0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.10*** 
(0.04) 
0.64*** 
(0.05) 
0.68*** 
(0.04) 
0.26*** 
(0.05) 
0.94*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.04) 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.05 
Number of employees 9,047 8,908 9,079 9,154 9,137 9,115 9,161 9,081 
Number of workplaces 964 965 965 965 965 965 965 965 
Notes: Weighted OLS regressions. Dummies for missing observations are not presented. All models control for individual and workplace job characteristics. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1. 
Base: All employees in the WERS (2011) survey with at least one year’s tenure in private workplaces with 11 or more employees, with no missing data on job quality. 
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CONCLUSION 
Using linked employer-employee data this article has undertaken a comparative study on 
Britain and France that focuses on the effects of firm size and ILMs on non-pecuniary job 
quality. Three hypotheses were tested which emanate from the literature on institutional 
systems in France and Britain. Contrary to the first hypothesis, job quality was higher in 
Britain than in France: skill development, training participation, job autonomy, work-life 
balance and relations between employers and employees are all rated more poorly in France 
than in Britain. Job demands are also higher in France than in Britain. Skills’ match to a job 
is the only dimension which offers better job quality to French employees. There are no 
significant differences between France and Britain in relation to job insecurity. There was 
broad support for the second hypothesis, which was that firm size would be negatively 
associated with job quality in both countries. This was the case when estimating a model for 
job quality using the additive scale, although analyses of subcomponents of job quality 
revealed quite a complex picture, with firm size negatively associated with job quality in 
eight of the sixteen models, positively associated with job quality in three of the models, and 
non-significant in the remaining five models.   
There was also broad support for the third hypothesis that ILMs improve job quality in 
France but not in Britain. Again, the result was apparent for the job quality additive scale 
though results for the job quality subcomponents were less clear-cut. 
There are a number of limitations to this study. It is impossible to tackle the issue of non-
random exposure of different sorts of worker to different types of job quality environments. 
Results may differ somewhat once non-random selection is accounted for. Also it is unclear 
as to whether poorer perceptions of job quality in large firms reflect objective job quality 
criteria or whether they simply reflect different reference points of employees in small and 
large firms. It may be, for instance, that those workers who sort into small firms have 
fundamentally different expectations to those sorting into larger firms, or else they are 
different sorts of people whose preferences differ in ways that are difficult to observe. 
Ideally, it is necessary to observe workers switching firms to establish what role unobserved 
worker heterogeneity plays, but that is not possible with these cross-sectional data. 
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APPENDICES 
A1. Job Quality variables in the WERS survey 
 Strongly 
agree Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly disagree 
 Coded 1 Coded 0 
Job demand 
I never seem to have enough time to get my 
work done (N=11,333) 
14 27 31 25 3 
Employee-employer relations 
Managers are sincere in attempting to 
understand employees’ views (N=11,370) 
11 43 24 15 6 
Skill development 
Managers encourage to develop their skills 
(N=11,351) 
13 42 26 13 6 
Adverse effects of work on one’s private 
life  
I often find it difficult to fulfill my 
commitments outside of work because of the 
amount of time I spend on my job 
(N=11,506) 
9 20 25 37 9 
 Strongly 
agree Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly disagree 
 Coded 0 Coded 1 
Job insecurity  
I feel my job is secure in this workplace 
(N=11,147 ) 
17 46 21 12 4 
Notes: Weighted frequencies in cells in percentages. 14% of employees reported that they strongly agreed that they 
never seemed to have enough time to get their work done. 
Base: All employees with at least one year of tenure, in private sector workplaces with 11 or more employees, with no 
missing data on job quality. 
Source: WERS (2011) survey. 
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A2. Other job quality variables in the WERS survey  
 Weighted Frequencies Coded 
 
Training participation: Apart from health and safety training, how much training have you had 
during the last 12 months, either paid or organized by your employer? 
None  34 0 
Less than 1 day  13 0 
1 to less than 2 days  16 1 
2 to less than 5 days 20 1 
5 to less than 10 days  10 1 
10 days and more  6 1 
N=11,468  
Skills’ match to a job: How well do the work skills you personally have match the skills you 
need to do your present job?  
Much higher  20 0 
A bit higher  32 0 
About the same 44 1 
A bit lower 4 0 
Much lower 1 0 
N=11,489  
Job autonomy: In general, how much influence do you have over how to do your work? 
A lot  54 1 
Some  31 1 
A little  10 0 
None  5 0 
N=11,446  
Notes: frequencies in cells in percentages. 34 % of employees reported that they had no training in the last 
12 months, 20 % of employees reported that their skills are much higher than the present job they had, and 
54 % of employees reported that they had a lot of influence over their work. 
Source: WERS (2011) survey. 
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A3. Job Quality variables in the REPONSE survey 
 Always Often Sometimes Never 
 Coded 1 Coded 0 
Job demand: In your work, is there any 
time pressure? (N=11,160) 31 41 25 2 
Adverse effects of work on one’s private 
life  
Does your work allow you to organize your 
private life satisfactorily? (N=11,179) 
18 45 30 6 
Job autonomy: Are you free to decide how 
to do your work? (N=11,161) 20 47 23 10 
Skills’ match to a job: In your work, are 
you fully able to use your skills? N=11,132 19 45 30 7 
Skill development: Does your work enable 
you to learn new things? N=11,147 11 32 45 12 
Employee-employer relations: Does your 
line manager pay attention to what you say? 
(N=11,115) 
15 36 39 10 
Notes: Weighted frequencies in cells in percentages. 18 % of employees reported that work always allowed them to 
organize private life satisfactorily. 
Base: All employees with at least one year of tenure, in private sector workplaces with 11 or more employees, with 
no missing data on job quality. 
Source: REPONSE (2011) survey. 
A4. Other job quality variables in the REPONSE survey  
 Weighted Frequencies Coded 
 
Training participation: During the last three years, have you undertaken any vocational 
training financed by your employer? (REPONSE survey) 
Yes 46 1 
No  54 0 
N=11,002  
Job insecurity: During the next 12 months, what is the likelihood of losing the job? 
Very high 5 1 
High 11 1 
Low  47 0 
Nil 37 0 
N=8,593  
Notes: frequencies in cells in percentages. 46% of employees reported that they had vocational 
training in the past three years, 5% of employees reported that the likelihood was very high to lose 
the job. 
Base: All employees with at least one year of tenure, in private sector workplaces with 11 or more 
employees, with no missing data on job quality. 
Source: REPONSE (2011) survey. 
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A5. Correlation matrix of job quality measures in the REPONSE survey 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Free to decide how to work 1.00        
2. Believes job is not secure -0.16 1.00       
3. Work adversely affects private life -0.20 0.13 1.00      
4. Able to learn or develop skills 0.26 -0.12 -0.11 1.00     
5. Skills matched to job 0.34 -0.19 -0.15 0.39 1.00    
6. Training received 0.11 -0.09 -0.03 0.19 0.13 1.00   
7. Manager pays attention/understands 
employees 
0.31 -0.20 -0.21 0.29 0.34 0.13 1.00  
8. Working under time pressures -0.06 0.05 0.15 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 1.00 
Base: Employees of all firms with 11 or more employees with at least one year’s tenure in private sector 
workplace. N= 8,201 
 
 
A6. Correlation matrix of job quality measures in the WERS survey 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Free to decide how to work 1.00        
2. Believes job is not secure -0.13 1.00       
3. Work adversely affects private life -0.05 0.09 1.00      
4. Able to learn or develop skills 0.19 -0.19 -0.11 1.00     
5. Skills matched to job 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.13 1.00    
6. Training received 0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.26 0.03 1.00   
7. Manager pays attention/understands 
employees 
0.19 -0.22 -0.13 0.51 0.09 0.14 1.00  
8. Working under time pressures -0.01 0.07 0.27 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.08 1.00 
Base: Employees of all firms with 11 or more employees with at least one year’s tenure in private sector 
workplace. N= 10,592 
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A7. The distribution of employees across firm size in the WERS and REPONSE 
surveys 
 Britain (WERS) France (REPONSE) 
11-49 15% 24% 
50-499 23% 34% 
500-4,999 29%  25% 
5,000 and more 31% 16% 
Missing 2% 1% 
N 11,581 11,244 
Notes: Weighted frequencies in cells in percentages.  
Base: All employees with at least one year of tenure, in private sector workplaces with 11 or more 
employees 
 
 
A8. The share of employees in workplaces with an ILM orientation in the WERS  
and REPONSE surveys 
 Britain (WERS) France (REPONSE) 
Yes 13% 33% 
No 80% 65% 
Missing 7% 2% 
N 11,581 11,244 
Notes: In the WERS survey 13% of employees are in workplaces which have an ‘ILM’ orientation in 
the WERS survey. The ILM orientation of the workplace is defined by Forth et al. (2016) as the share 
of workplaces with high levels of job tenure and the payment of above market wages.  
Base: All employees with at least one year of tenure, in private sector workplaces with 11 or more 
employees 
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